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The Cambodian Genocide Tribunal and the Very Slow Road to Justice
In June 2011 genocide trial opened in Phnom Penh, Cambodia that featured what were likely some 
of the most notorious defendants in a crimes against humanity or genocide tribunal since the Nuremburg 
Trials that followed World War II. The four highest-ranking living leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime were 
the defendants in the trial. Cambodia, also known as Democratic Kampuchea (DK) under the Khmer Rouge 
(KR), was the scene of one of the twentieth century’s worst genocides. The KR pursued policies that resulted 
in the deaths of an estimated 1,700,000 Cambodians during their reign from April 1975 to January 1979.1 The 
defendants were among the key decision makers of the regime, although the leader of the Khmer Rouge and 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), Pol Pot, aka Brother Number One, had died 
in 1998. Nuon Chea, Brother Number Two, had held the position of Deputy Secretary of the CPK and was 
regarded as the chief ideologue of the regime. He had also served as president of the People’s Representative 
Assembly. Ieng was the Foreign Minister of Democratic Kampuchea throughout its existence and remained 
a leading figure in the KR until he surrendered to the government of Cambodia in 1996. Ieng Thirith was 
married to Ieng Sary and served as Minister of Social Affairs in the DK government. At a meeting of the CPK 
Center in October 1975 that designated the responsibilities of the governing elite, Ieng Thirith was placed…
“in charge of culture, social welfare, and foreign affairs, sharing the last field with her husband Ieng Sary.”2 The 
fourth defendant was Khieu Samphan, who served as head of state in Democratic Kampuchea and also was, 
according to the October 1975 meeting, in charge of the “accountancy and pricing aspects of commerce.”3 Not 
since Nuremburg have leading officials of a regime responsible for so many deaths been subjected to a judicial 
proceeding.
Despite the satisfaction that some observers, foreign and domestic, derived from seeing some of the 
major perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide brought before a tribunal, many aspects of the trial before the 
court, formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, and often called 
the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,) left various concerned parties immensely displeased. The trial commenced 32 
years after the Khmer Rouge had been driven from power by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in January 
1979. Even after the principle of genocide trials for leading Khmer Rouge cadres had been agreed to in 1997, 
seemingly interminable haggling between the United Nations and the Cambodian government over the 
composition of the court and the scope of its jurisdiction, delayed the start of judicial proceedings for a dozen 
years. (Only a single defendant had been tried before the start of the trial of the major perpetrators in 2011.) 
Many human rights activists argued that there were numerous other perpetrators of genocide who should be 
brought before the tribunal in future proceedings. In the summer of 2012, the Cambodian government led by 
Prime Minister Hun Sen remained adamant in its opposition to holding more than two trials and there was 
little evidence that the United Nations or major donor nations to Cambodia could, or would, exert sufficient 
pressure to force a concession from Hun Sen that would permit more trials. Critics of the ECCC argued that 
it was, in essence, too little and too late.
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This article explores the political circumstances that led to the two trials of Khmer Rouge genocide 
perpetrators that were undertaken decades after the regime’s demise and the reasons why there would most 
likely be just five persons tried for the crimes committed during the 44 month existence of the dystopia that 
was Democratic Kampuchea. It will be argued that given the history of genocide trials and the  national and 
international political imperatives at play in establishing and sustaining the ECCC, the very slow and limited 
judicial process was, if not inevitable, highly likely.
The Long Journey to Two Trials
The negotiations and political maneuvering that would eventually lead to the establishment of the ECCC 
occurred as the government of Cambodia was integrating some elements of the Khmer Rouge back into 
Cambodian society and politics. Because Vietnam was an ally of the Soviet Union and the Khmer Rouge had 
been close to the Chinese government, the West and China offered direct and indirect support to the KR until 
the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. The Khmer Rouge remained a significant factor in Cambodian politics for 
several years after the end of the Cold War. Not least among the KR’s assets in the 1990s was an armed force 
of roughly 10,000 troops that were part of its broader infrastructure along Cambodia’s border with Thailand. 
When Ieng Sary defected to the government in 1996 with about 3,000 troops, he significantly weakened 
the Khmer Rouge. When Pol Pot sent armed soldiers to suppress the disloyal Ieng Sary and his troops, the 
expeditionary forces collapsed due to mass defections.4 The Khmer Rouge was further weakened by internal 
divisions, but still contained assets useful to other politicians in Cambodia. Because he controlled an armed 
militia, Ieng Sary was able to gain leverage as both main contenders for national power, co-Prime Ministers 
Prince Ranariddh Sihanouk and Hun Sen, sought Ieng Sary’s support and both supported an amnesty for 
him.5
In 1997, desperate for support in his struggle for power with Hun Sen, Ranariddh agreed to an alliance 
with Khieu Samphan, who wished to break away from the Khmer Rouge remnants located along the Thai 
border.6 (Rananriddh and his royalist party lost their power struggle with Hun Sen and his Cambodian 
People’s Party (CPP).) The Khmer Rouge insurgency collapsed in 1998 when only Ta Mok, once known as 
Brother Number Five in the KR hierarchy, and less fraternally as “the butcher” in circles not sympathetic to 
the Khmer Rouge, declined to reconcile with the regnant political order. Sorpong Peu observes that when 
Khem Ngoun, Ta Mok’s chief of staff, defected from the last major KR holdout, the Khmer Rouge’s insurgency 
was over.7 (Ta Mok died in prison in 2006 as he awaited trial for genocide and crimes against humanity). An 
important element of the truces and amnesties that occurred as the Khmer Rouge insurgency finally collapsed 
was the integration of many KR officials into the government and military.8
 After accepting amnesty in 1996, Ieng Sary remained in his base area of Pailin province, and later took 
up residence in a prosperous neighborhood in Phnom Penh. In 1998, Nuon Chea, who was known as Brother 
Number Two in the CPK, and Khieu Samphan, who had served as head of state during the Khmer Rouge 
years in power, surrendered to the national government. Both were welcomed at Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 
country estate. The prime minister indicated that he believed that it was time to “dig a hole and bury the 
past.”9 After international and domestic criticism of his greeting the two defectors and his suggestion that 
perhaps the two should not be tried, Hun Sen issued an unclear “clarification” of his position, “My stance is 
this: the trial of the Khmer Rouge is over, but the issue still continues to exist. It is over based on the verdict 
of the people’s court in 1979, which is still valid and acknowledged by the royal decree granting amnesty to 
Ieng Sary in 1996. The issue that still exists is that of the establishment of a tribunal based on the views of 
international and national jurists who are now doing their work.”10 These comments were not Hun Sen’s last 
ambiguous remarks on the question of trials for crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge during their years 
in power. In early 1999, Nuon Chea and Khieu Samphan took a government sponsored tour of Cambodia 
that included visits to the seaside resort at Sihanoukville and the temples of Angkor Wat.11 In March 1999, Ta 
Mok and Kaing Guek Eav, commandant of the S-21 interrogation center, were arrested and later charged with 
genocide.12 The pattern of solicitude for Khmer Rouge leaders combined with governmental agreements to 
some prosecutions continued from the late 1990s through 2012. The various domestic and, more significantly, 
international pressures for trials of Khmer Rouge leaders and the presence of many former Khmer Rouge 
cadre in the government, including Hun Sen himself, rendered a twisted policy path inevitable.13
In 1997, Hun Sen had agreed to a trial for those Khmer Rouge leaders who were deemed “most senior” 
and “most responsible” for the crimes that occurred between 1975 and 1979.14 Of course the concepts most 
senior and most responsible were left undefined. In 1998 Hun Sen asserted that the international community 
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should examine some additional matters. He requested that prosecutors investigate the American bombing of 
Cambodia that had decimated the country in the years before 1975.15 He also stated that he thought an inquiry 
should be made into Chinese government support for the Khmer Rouge. While both topics are surely worth 
examining, such investigations would most certainly have been opposed by the United States and China, 
respectively.16 While motive is almost always difficult to discern, these demands for an investigation of the 
relationships of major world powers to the Khmer Rouge were likely made to further delay and complicate 
arrangements for a tribunal. Still, Hun Sen was correct when he argued that some of the countries arguing for 
a series trial had supported the Khmer Rouge either directly or indirectly in the 1970s and 1980s.
Hun Sen first agreed to the principle trials of perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide in 1997, but 
negotiations about the terms of the trial dragged on for several years. In an inconsistent manner, the United 
Nations placed pressure on the CPP government to work out terms and conditions for establishing an 
international tribunal. The U.N. and members of the international community who took an interest in the 
matter preferred that as much control as possible be in international hands. Outside Cambodia, it was widely 
believed that the Cambodian judicial system lacked the resources, competence and integrity to carry out a 
series of trials in a manner that would be acceptable to the international community. Invoking the principles 
of Cambodian national sovereignty and respect for his country, Hun Sen sought as much Cambodian control 
over the process as possible. He also argued that permitting an unlimited number of defendants could 
destabilize the country. The Prime Minister resisted an international tribunal with wide-ranging jurisdiction. 
His major political rival, Norodom Ranariddh, joined him.17
Six years of difficult and contentious negotiations between United Nations officials and the Cambodian 
government passed before some basic guidelines for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC) were established. In 2003, under an arrangement worked out by David Scheffer, the United States 
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, the majority of judges in the court would be Cambodian, however, 
no decision would be ratified without the assent of at least one international judge. Scheffer believed that 
this arrangement provided for an international veto over the actions of jurists from a judicial system that 
was widely distrusted while preserving a measure of Cambodian sovereignty. In fact, the term Extraordinary 
Chambers was chosen to distinguish this tribunal from the suspect Cambodian judicial system. The Courts of 
Cambodia portion of the formal name of the tribunal was a nod to Cambodian sensitivities about sovereignty 
and acknowledgment of the role Cambodian jurists would play in the trials.
In the three years that followed the establishment of the ECCC very little progress was made in 
establishing a basic administrative structure for the court. In 2006, David Tolbert, an American attorney who 
worked at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, examined the court in Cambodia 
and determined that, “it had no administrative leadership, particularly with respect to court management, 
including translation and interpretation, and the witness-protection program. The international side had had 
essentially given over judicial management to the Cambodian. The Cambodian staff in charge had virtually 
no knowledge or experience, and most had no judicial background. And yet there were a large number of 
them, hundreds in fact.”18 Tolbert concluded that the court was in no position to conduct a trial. Two years 
after Tolbert’s initial visit to Cambodia, there had been little progress in establishing a functioning court. In 
an effort to break a decade long stalemate, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Tolbert as an 
assistant secretary general with the primary task of assisting in the establishment of a viable tribunal.
While the terms that eventually permitted the ECCC to convene and eventually to begin trials were 
worked out, the ten-year struggle between the U.N. and the Cambodian government over the terms and 
conditions of the tribunal was indicative of the widely divergent agendas each party held. Hun Sen and his 
government were determined to keep control of the tribunal in Cambodian hands. The determination of the 
Cambodian Prime Minister to retain control of the tribunal, can of course, be read in more than one way. The 
assertion that such an international tribunal would abridge Cambodian sovereignty is undoubtedly true. The 
U.N. and human rights advocacy groups did not believe that the Cambodian government had the competence 
or the integrity to conduct a series of trials. Also because of Cambodia’s widespread and deserved reputation 
as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. International actors were convinced that they could only 
achieve their means by abrogating Cambodian sovereignty, though few people would make such a bold and 
direct assertion in public.
The scope of the ECCC was to become the major point of contention between the Cambodian government 
that wanted to limit the number of cases brought before the court and the U.N. human rights groups who 
favored an extensive series of trials. These controversies slowed the judicial process. A dozen years elapsed 
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from the conception of the tribunal to the beginning of the trial of S-21 commandant Duch in 2009. The main 
trial of the surviving members of the Khmer Rouge elite began in the summer of 2011.
Case 001: The Trial of Comrade Duch
The first trial held by the ECCC was that of Kaing Guek Eav, better known as Duch. As commandant of 
S-21, or the Tuol Sleng Prison, Duch presided over the torture and murder of at least 14,000 people.19 Most of 
those killed there were party and government officials who were victims of the Khmer Rouge’s constant search 
for counterrevolutionaries, many of whom consistent with Maoist doctrine, were thought to reside within the 
ranks of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Duch might seem an odd figure to be prosecuted first for no 
other reason than that he was born a least a decade later (1942) than the four defendants in the second and 
possibly last of the ECCC trials. Duch was also the least politically powerful person tried by the court. While 
the most horrific tortures preceded the murders committed at S-21, Duch was not a policy maker and held no 
national office in Democratic Kampuchea. Duch was the most hands-on killer among the defendants, but was 
not accused of formulating the policies perpetrated. While he was not a high-ranking official of the Khmer 
Rouge regime, it is important to note that Duch had been a committed member of the CPK for decades. 
He might have made the ideal first defendant because he was willing to confess to guilt on all the counts of 
the indictment against him. Also because of his role as commandant at S-21, it was much easier to attribute 
direct responsibility for crimes to Duch than to other officials who held diversified portfolios with in the 
government and party during the reign of the Khmer Rouge.
Duch’s trial began in March 2009 (the defendant had been incarcerated for a decade) and concluded 
when the tribunal rendered its guilty verdict and 35-year prison sentence in July 2010. (The sentence was 
later reduced to 19 years because Duch has spent 11 years in pre-trial detention and because this time in pre-
trial detention exceeded the maximum time permitted by Cambodian law. After an appeal by the prosecutor 
Duch’s sentence was changed to imprisonment for life.20 Duch was charged with “crimes against humanity, 
enslavement, torture, sexual abuses, and other inhumane acts.”21 At the outset of his trial, Duch accepted 
all 260 counts of his indictment. During the course of his trial Duch would often accept responsibility for 
various horrific actions that occurred at S-21. His two main objections to the charges against him were that, as 
someone not part of the governing cabal, he was only following orders; orders he was forced to obey to protect 
himself and his family. While attributing the main responsibility for the atrocities at S-21 to Pol Pot, Duch also 
was capable of admitting his own guilt, albeit as a subordinate of the regime “…Pol Pot was a murderer and 
more than a million people were killed under the hand of Pol Pot. At S-21, my hand is stained with the blood 
of the people killed there.”22 Duch’s testimony was, of course, offered as part of a defense strategy to present 
Duch as the exemplar of contrition in the hope of obtaining a measure of leniency. Given the evidence against 
him and the vile nature of his crimes, such a strategy was probably the only possible legal strategy that Duch 
could pursue.
Duch’s trial included far more evidence about S-21 than was necessary to demonstrate his guilt. The 
adjudication of the charges against the defendant is, however, not always the sole or even the main purpose 
of genocide or crimes against humanity trial. Of greater importance may be the establishment of the record 
of crimes committed by the genocide perpetrators and the dissemination of these findings through the 
media coverage that a trial often attracts. For example, the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel in 1961 included 
extensive testimony about the Nazis’ genocidal Final Solution even though Eichmann stated that he did not 
dispute the testimony presented about the crimes committed against European Jews by the regime he served. 
(Eichmann, as is well known offered the defense that he was following orders, the quintessential duty of a law 
abiding citizen.) One purpose of the Eichmann trial was to educate the world about the Holocaust, an event 
about which far less was known in 1961 when the Holocaust was not a widely discussed topic in academic 
circles or popular literature and media.23
Duch’s trial took an unexpected turn in November 2009 when Kar Savuth, his Cambodian attorney, 
asked that Duch be freed because he was not among those most responsible for the crimes committed during 
the KR era. Because no other mid-level officials would be tried, Duch’s attorney argued that his client should 
be released rather than serve as a scapegoat for the crimes of the Khmer Rouge. This change of strategy led 
to the resignation of Francios Roux, his French attorney, who felt that the contrition strategy of the defense 
had been undermined by a point of law that should have been raised at the outset of the trial.24 Because Kar 
Savuth had also served as legal adviser to Hun Sen there was speculation of government collusion with the 
defense team that led to the change in legal strategy by the previously submissive defendant. Kar Savuth’s 
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assertion that Duch was the only non-elite KR cadre to be charged before the tribunal was, in an odd sort of 
way, consistent with the views expressed by Hun Sen and the court’s Cambodian co-prosecutor both of whom 
opposed a large number of prosecutions. The only difference between the positions of Duch and Hun Sen 
was that Duch did not believe that any KR officials other than the elite should be prosecuted. Hun Sen was 
willing to accept that one mid–level cadre (Duch) should serve a prison sentence for crimes against humanity 
committed by the Khmer Rouge. Stephanie Giry claims that; by the end of Duch’s trial; the Cambodian 
government, the Cambodian co-prosecutor, and Duch’s Cambodian attorney were all in agreement as to the 
scope of the ECCC. All of these parties took positions that implied that there should be one additional trial, 
that of the four leading major figures from the KR regime, and that this proceeding should conclude the work 
of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal.
Case 002: The Trial of the Khmer Rouge Leadership
While there were turns and twists in the trial of Comrade Duch, the trial that followed it was bound 
to be immensely more complex. The leadership trial promised to be a lengthy one as it involved issues of 
responsibility for the genocide, atrocities, and other crimes committed by the KR government. The advanced 
age of the defendants raised concerns that one or more of them might not survive along trial. (As of August 
2011 Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary were both 85 years old, while Ieng Thiriht was 79 and Khieu Samphan was 80 
years old). Some also noted that because of their advanced ages, that if convicted, the defendants were unlikely 
to serve a significant portion of the lengthy prison sentences they would probably receive (life imprisonment 
was the maximum sentence that the ECCC could impose on a convicted defendant). The case against the 
four defendants was further complicated in late August of 2011 when, Dr John Campbell of New Zealand, 
a medical examiner appointed by the Tribunal, testified that Ieng Thirith suffered “significant cognitive 
impairment” that was most likely due to Alzheimer’s disease.25 Dr. Campbell indicated that he thought it 
would be difficult for Ieng Thirith to participate fully in her defense and also recommended that she given a 
more extensive medical evaluation. In September the court announced that four additional physicians would 
examine Ieng Thirth in an effort to reach a more conclusive assessment of her mental state.26 The case against 
Ieng Thirith was dropped in November, 2011 on the grounds that her dementia rendered her unfit to stand 
trial. The ECCC recommended that she be released from custody.27 The number of defendants in the second 
trial was reduced to two when Ieng Sary died at age 87 in March 2014.28
The indictments against Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary, and Khieu Samphan were identical and were excerpted 
on the ECCC website:29
[…] is alleged to be responsible, through his acts or omissions (committed via a joint criminal enterprise), 
for having planned, instigated, ordered, or aided and abetted, or being responsible by virtue of superior 
responsibility, for the following crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979:
• Crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation imprisonment, torture, 
persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds and other inhumane acts)
• Genocide, by killing members of the groups of Vietnamese and Cham 
• Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, willfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, willfully depriving a prisoner of war or civilian the 
rights of fair and regular trial, unlawful deportation or unlawful confinement of a civilian)
• Homicide, torture and religious persecution, as defined by the Cambodian Penal Code from 1956
Ieng Thirith was subject to a similar indictment though with respect to the charge of crimes against 
humanity, she was alleged to have been guilty by having ordered such acts or having been guilty by “virtue of 
superior responsibility.30 The text of the indictments and the powerful government and party positions once 
held by the four defendants would seem to dictate that this was the major trial of the ECCC for historical 
and legal purposes. Those concerned with the resolution of these matters for either purpose likely regretted 
that it took so long for the trial to arrive and that the defendants were at such advanced ages when the trial 
commenced.
The defendants raised objections to the proceedings and argued that they were not guilty of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, or genocide. Three of the four defendants claimed that they were protected 
from prosecution by the ten-year statute of limitations of the prior Cambodian legal code. Ieng Sary claimed 
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that his trial by the ECCC was a case of double jeopardy because he had been tried in absentia and sentenced 
to death by the Vietnamese installed government of Cambodia. King Norodom Sihanouk pardoned him in 
1996. On the basis of these prior legal developments, Ieng Sary claimed immunity from prosecution. As a 
practical matter, the procedural claims about jurisdiction, double jeopardy, and prior pardons were very likely 
to be overruled by the court which was constituted for the very purpose of trying defendants such as those 
that appeared before it in Case 002. Still, the various legal arguments about the legitimacy of the charges 
delayed the already very long judicial process in Case 002.
The political complexity of the ECCC proceeding was demonstrated again when Nuon Chea’s three 
attorneys resigned saying that Cambodian government interference prevented them from presenting a 
vigorous defense of their client. The lawyers cited the refusal of sitting government ministers to respond to 
court summonses as a major impediment to their efforts to defend Nuon Chea. The lawyers’ complaint was 
described as having a degree of merit according to an observer from the Open Society Justice Initiative. While 
the testimony of government ministers would not likely lead to an acquittal of Nuon Chea, the Hun Sen 
Regime had nothing to gain from testimony that would call attention to the roles that current government 
officials played in the Khmer Rouge government.31
Are Two Trials Sufficient?
One of the most contentious issues between the Cambodian government and international human rights 
groups, as well as many international prosecutors and judges, was the question of whether there should be 
additional cases pursued beyond Cases 001 and 002. Many transnational human rights organizations as well 
as international prosecutors and consultants serving at the ECCC wished to proceed with Case 003 which 
was widely believed to concern the actions of Meas Mut and Sou Met, who were respectively the heads of the 
Khmer Rouge Navy and Air Force. Both Meas Mut and Sou Met have been accused of being responsible for 
the deaths of thousands of purged KR cadres. Hun Sen consistently opposed any efforts to expand the scope 
of the ECCC beyond the five defendants in the first two cases. His statements on this matter were consistently 
unequivocal. In October 2010, Hun Sen told Ban Ki-moon that Case 002 would be the final ECCC trial and 
that further cases were “not allowed.”32 Khieu Kanharith, a spokesman for the government, warned the ECCC 
foreign staff against pursuing further cases and said of these staff, “If they want to go into Case 003 or 004, they 
should just pack their bags and return home.”33 On the issue of whether there should be any trials after Case 
002, there was no obfuscation by the Cambodian government.
The Cambodian Prime Minister argued that further trials would cause civil unrest and possibly civil war 
in the country. Hun Sen claimed that he would prefer that the ECCC fail in its mission rather than permit 
additional trials that would produce civil war.34 His opposition to expanded proceedings by the tribunal was 
supported by Cambodian judges on the tribunal as well as Cambodian co-prosecutor Chea Leang, who had 
long been clear about her opposition to further trials. When international co-prosecutor Andrew Cayley 
said the alleged crimes in Case 003 had not been fully investigated and deserved further examination; his 
Cambodian counterpart did not support him. Disputing Cayley’s assertion, Chea Leang argued that the 
suspects in Case 003 were not within the court’s jurisdiction because they were not senior officials of the 
Khmer Rouge government and were not “most responsible” for the crimes committed from 1975 to 1979.35
There was considerable speculation that a series of cases would result in many current Cambodian 
government officials being summoned as witnesses. It is worth recalling that Hun Sen himself was once Khmer 
Rouge official, albeit of low rank, before he defected to Vietnam.36 The revelation that significant numbers of 
former KR cadres held positions in the government, while well known in Cambodia and among those who 
closely follow events in the country, would have been a source of some international embarrassment for Hun 
Sen’s government. Since it is likely that a considerable number of Cambodians had served in the government 
in some capacity under the KR, there was probably some popular support in Cambodia for limiting the scope 
of the ECCC tribunals.37 To the extent that Hun Sen secured the surrender of recalcitrant Khmer Rouge 
soldiers and leaders by informal pardons and classic political patronage, trials that exposed these dealings 
had the potential to destabilize the regime and perhaps, Cambodian society as a whole. For those benefiting 
from the status quo, there was nothing to be gained by extensive probing into the past actions of government 
officials on the part of the ECCC or anyone else for that matter.
Human rights advocates were adamant that Case 003 had to proceed if justice was to been done in 
Cambodia. Anne Heindel, legal advisor for the research organization Documentation Center of Cambodia,38 
argued that if the ECCC were perceived as capitulating to Cambodian government pressure by blocking 
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further investigation of Case 003, its credibility on Cases 001 and 002 would be suspect as well. In Heindel’s 
words, “There’s no way you can separate Case 003 out from what’s come before.”39 In April 2011, the co-
investigating judges of the ECCC, Sigfried Blunk of Germany and You Bunleng of Cambodia, announced 
they were closing their investigation with regard to Case 003. Citing political interference by the Cambodian 
government in the proceedings of the ECCC, Blunk resigned his position in October 2011.40 Laurent Kasper-
Ansermet of Switzerland, another international judge, resigned from the ECCC in March 2012. He asserted 
that his Cambodian colleague You Bunleng was blocking the court from investigating additional suspects.41
The decision not to proceed with further investigation of Case 003 was widely seen as a step towards the 
eventual closure of the case without any indictments of the suspects. Critics claimed that the judges conducted 
only a cursory investigation in the case and further alleged that political influence may have been brought to 
bear in a successful effort to forestall any action on the case. The Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI), a U.S. 
based organization founded by George Soros, called for a U.N. investigation of the ECCC alleging that Case 
003 raised issues of “judicial independence, misconduct, and competency.”42 The OSJI statement also contained 
the stinging allegation that, “the court itself is on the verge of embracing impunity” for the various crimes of 
the Khmer Rouge.43 Several members of the legal staff resigned from the ECCC to protest the decision to 
discontinue the investigation of Case 003. Among those resigning their positions at the tribunal was Stephen 
Heder, a prominent historian of the Khmer Rouge era based at the School of Oriental and African Studies at 
the University of London, who had served as a consultant to the investigating judges. In his resignation letter, 
Heder claimed that the ECCC judges’ office was “professionally dysfunctional.”44 The judges were equally 
strident in a response to the resignations of court personnel, issuing a statement that welcomed the departure 
of those staff, “who ignore the sole responsibility of the co-investigating judges” with regard to Case 003.45
It is also important to note that representatives of several western governments were non-committal on 
the issue of whether Case 003 should be pursued. Some responded by emphasizing the importance of Case 
002. The United States Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Stephen Rapp, asserted his belief that 
the ECCC must be free of interference from the Cambodian government. Rapp also offered statements that, 
however, showed a degree of understanding for those who wished to limit the number of investigations and 
prosecutions. According to Rapp, “it’s a question of the mandate, but it’s also a question of resources as well. 
We expect people to be making decisions that you can’t pursue every case. We want them to make them on 
a proper basis, with an understanding that resources are limited and they need to prioritize.”46 While such a 
statement is neutral on its face, it had to be disappointing to those who wished for more than two trials and 
viewed international pressure as the only means of achieving their objective. Hun Sen and others opposed to 
additional trials must have been pleased by the views of Rapp and others who took similar positions.
The ECCC and the Politics of Graft
In addition to other problems and controversies plaguing the tribunal, the ECCC was also the subject 
of allegations of corruption by Cambodian administrators in charge of the large court staff. In 2008, several 
employees alleged to U.N. staff members that they were forced to pay 30 percent of their salaries to their 
superiors to obtain and retain their positions. While the results of a subsequent U.N. investigation were not 
released to the public, a report for Cambodia Tribunal Monitor indicated that there was considerable evidence 
in support of the corruption allegations.47 Moreover, the cost of the trial has consistently exceeded projections 
and the tribunal has seemed on many occasions to be on the verge of insolvency. Corruption and cost are not 
the main concern of a court conducting genocide trials, but in the case of the ECCC they contributed to an 
already growing perception of a court in disarray.
The allegations of cost overruns and outright corruption that have plagued the ECCC should come as 
no surprise to those who have followed Cambodia’s pattern and practice in this regard. Stanford Journalism 
professor Joel Brinkley has argued that virtually every institution in Cambodian society is a site of bribery, 
blackmail, or embezzlement. Brinkley includes education, health care, natural resource extraction, the police, 
and judicial system as among the Cambodian institutions where kleptomania seems to be the reigning ethos. 
For good measure, Brinkley informs us that babies available for foreign adoption from Cambodia were often 
separated from their mothers by deceit, force, and in some cases, outright theft.48 French journalist Francois 
Hauter vividly offers his view of Cambodia under Hun Sen, “The country has become a regime of organized 
pillage, a vast bazaar of plundered goods, a regional center for shady business of every kind: drugs, gambling, 
sex. The head of the national police, one of Hun Sen’s closest associates, owns the largest brothel in the country. 
Many officials enrich themselves at the peasants’ expense.”49
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Transparency International (TI), an NGO that monitors private and public sector corruption, has long 
cited Cambodia as a society and a government replete with various forms of corruption. For example, in 2006 
TI completed a national study that included some trenchant remarks about Cambodia. The report concluded, 
“The NIS Study of Cambodia found that corruption has pervaded almost every sector of the country. The 
payment of unofficial fees is necessary to secure any range of services, including medical care, education 
credentials and even birth certificates. A degree of political will for reform exists within the government, but 
the reality is that those in power have little reason to change a system that has secured them much power and 
personal wealth.”50 It should be no surprise that in a poor country with a corrupt government, a tribunal that 
dispenses large sums of money would find itself enmeshed in allegations of corruption. In fact one value of the 
ECCC to the government might well have been as a source of patronage and graft. In any event, the frequent 
allegations of bribery and waste further sullied the ECCC’s reputation and could not have been helpful as it 
pursued its core mission.
Strategic Interests and International Influence in the Tribunal
If justice delayed is really justice denied then the Cambodian case is best viewed as justice largely denied. 
The Khmer Rouge regime, as has been mentioned previously, was deposed from power by the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia in January 1979. By the time Case 002 against the four elderly Khmer Rouge officials 
began in the summer of 2011, the Khmer Rouge had been out of power for more than 32 years. Of course the 
strategic calculations of the Cold War kept the Khmer Rouge in the Cambodian seat at the United Nations 
until 1991 Because Vietnam was allied with the Soviet Union during the latter decades of the Cold War, China 
and the United States condemned the 1979 invasion and had no interest in pursuing judicial action against 
the perpetrators of the genocide in Cambodia.51 In fact, the official position of the United States was that the 
genocidal Khmer Rouge were the rightful rulers of Cambodia. The Vietnamese installed regime, while not 
democratic, ended the mass killings in Cambodia. The fact that the government that assumed power as a result 
of the Vietnamese invasion ended the genocide was not a major concern for those who believed that geo-
political considerations outweighed any human rights issues.52 Zbigniew Brezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s 
National Security Advisor, told journalist Elizabeth Becker that while the United States could not openly 
cooperate with someone as morally reprehensible as Pol Pot, the U.S. did encourage the Chinese and Thai 
governments to support the Khmer Rouge because it continued to resist the Vietnamese proxy government 
in Phnom Penh.53 The very notion of bringing the Khmer Rouge leaders to trial was only possible with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent reordering of global politics.
A number of political circumstances may lead to a rapid and seemingly comprehensive trial of defendants 
charged with genocide or other crimes against humanity. The most obvious case is that of the Nuremburg 
trials that followed World War II. Nazi Germany had been completely defeated militarily and was occupied 
by the four powers that conducted the first and, most famous of the tribunals. The vanquished Germans 
had absolutely no say in what would happen to leading Nazis in the immediate aftermath of the war. In 
1945-1946, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States had a common interest in 
further vindicating their positions in the war by prosecuting leading officials from various institutions of the 
Nazi regime 54 The International Military Tribunal (IMT) conducted the first trial of those labeled major war 
criminals. While not above criticism as victor’s justice, the IMT was able to function quite smoothly because 
there was a general consensus among the occupying powers on trying those regarded as major figures in the 
various organs of the Nazi government.
An interesting contrast to the IMT is provided by the trial and ultimate fate of the defendants in the 
Einsatzgruppen trial conducted by the United States in 1947-48. The Einsatzgruppen were the mobile killing 
squads that murdered at least one million Jews by mass shootings, primarily in the Soviet Union (as it was 
constituted in 1941.)55 Twenty-four officers of the Einsatzgruppen were charged with mass murder and 22 
of the defendants were found guilty of crimes against humanity. Fourteen of the convicted officers were 
sentenced to death by hanging and two others to life imprisonment. In the end, only four of the convicted 
leaders of the mass murder squads were executed (all in 1951), and as a result of commutations and pardons, 
all of the surviving convicted Einsatzgruppen leaders had been released from incarceration by 1958. Given the 
vast number of murders that these men had committed and the indisputable evidence of their personal guilt, 
all but four of them might be regarded as having in the end been treated with extreme lenience. The change in 
the treatment of Nazi officials convicted of even the most serious crimes is likely rooted in the imperatives of 
the Cold War. The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) had been established in 1949 and contained 
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about 75 percent of the German population. West German was an ally of the Western powers in their struggle 
against the Soviet Union and it was thought that too many executions and other harsh punishments of Nazi 
criminals would demoralize the German population that the United States wished to rally to its side as it 
confronted its former ally, the Soviet Union. International politics played a major role in determining the fate 
of the genocidal killers who commanded units of the Einsatzgruppen.56
For human rights advocates to obtain the broader prosecution of genocide perpetrators in Cambodia 
they desired, there would have had to be a concerted effort by major powers to overcome the corruption and 
the strong resistance of the Cambodian government. It is not always necessary to have a deeply vested interest 
on the part of a powerful country or group of countries to operate a genocide tribunal, as the case of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) demonstrates. In Rwanda, the exile Tutsi led Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) won the four year war against the Hutu government in 1994 and ended the three month 
long genocide perpetrated against Tutsis residing in Rwanda. After the war, the RPF had both the motive and 
the power to assist in a trial of Hutu perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.
Another aspect of the terrible events of 1994 in Rwanda has not been placed before the ICTR. Credible 
research indicates that the RPF may have killed tens of thousands of Hutu civilians in the course of its struggle 
for power in Rwanda.57 Still prosecutors, most notably Carla Del Ponte, failed in their efforts to gain cooperation 
from Rwandan President Paul Kagame (a Tutsi and former RPF military commander) and his RPF regime to 
pursue judicial actions against RPF officials who may have committed massacres of Hutus. Little international 
pressure was brought to bear on the recalcitrant Rwandan government. The United States and Britain were the two 
external powers with the greatest capacity to influence the Kagame government. While he argues that sympathy 
for the plight of the Rwandans and guilt about the West’s indifference during the 1994 genocide generated 
support for the RPF, Victor Peskin claims that strategic calculations were a major factor in determining British 
and American policy with respect to the ICTR. In Peskin’s words, “In light of their strategic goals in Rwanda, 
Washington and London had little interest in pressing the Kigali regime to cooperate with investigations of 
RPF atrocities. Nor did the United States have an interest in shining a spotlight on the wave of post-1994 RPF 
atrocities against Hutu genocidaires and innocent civilians who had fled to Congo.”58 Peskin argues that the RPF 
led Rwandan government was a major source of Anglo-American influence in the resource rich and strife ridden 
Congo.59 The slaughter of Tutsis at the behest of Hutu Power advocates was indubitably the major component 
of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. ICTR prosecuted many of those directly responsible for the genocide of the 
Tutsis, but the political interests of various governments dictated the parameters of the trial.
Because roughly half of its national budget is derived from grants provided by foreign governments and 
international agencies, Cambodia is obviously vulnerable to a considerable measure of international pressure. 
Should donors care to exert influence on a matter such as genocide trials?60 In the absence of any concerted 
and vigorous external pressure by major powers, the United Nations was unlikely to intervene in a forceful 
way. After the June 2011, resignation of Stephen Heder, a spokesperson for U.N Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon issued a statement affirming the work of the ECCC and asserting its impartiality.61 Ban also denied 
that the U.N. had any role in instructing tribunal judges to not pursue additional cases.62 On the issue of 
whether there should be additional cases brought against anyone other than the five original defendants, 
Anne Heindel, legal advisor to the DC-CAM blamed the U.N. for not pressing for an expanded series of trials. 
According to Heindel, “The Cambodian government has been forthright all along that there would be no new 
trials...it’s the failure of the United Nations to act that’s been surprising.”63 Had she considered the motives and 
interests of nations such as the United States, China and Japan in Southeast Asia, Heindel might have been less 
surprised by the lack of U.N. support of a more expansive tribunal.
In a survey of Cambodia in 2010 written for an academic journal, Professor Heder noted that while 
relations with the U.N. remained fraught in 2010, Cambodia improved its standing with two of the world’s 
major powers. The United States and Cambodia agreed on a plan to use Cambodian territory to train Asian 
troops for peacekeeping operations.64 Margo Picken claims that counterterrorism training for Cambodian 
troops has been an increased focus of the U.S. government in recent years. In early 2012, Political scientist 
Kheang Un offered a similar view with regard to American interests in Cambodia”…the U.S. has shifted its 
Cambodian engagement from demanding respect for human rights and democracy to focusing on anti-
terrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and countering China’s influence.”65 While the United States might, in 
principle, be in favor of bringing justice to more perpetrators of the Cambodian genocide, such a matter 
ranked very low on the list of foreign policy concerns confronting the United States in the first eleven years 
of the 21st century.66
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China had a much more sustained and extensive relationship with the Cambodian regime than did the 
United States. Heder notes that between 2006 and 2010 China received approval for $6 billion of investment 
in Cambodia. Among the most important of these Chinese investments was the development of hydroelectric 
power projects designed to increase Cambodia’s capacity to export agricultural projects. There are, of course, 
benefits to both China and Cambodia in these deals.67 In 2007, journalist Francois Hauter argued that the 
Chinese government supported and protected Hun Sen’s corrupt regime in return for the right to develop 
Cambodian natural resources.68
China also had a strategic interest in maintaining a cordial relationship with the Hun Sen government. 
China is involved in disputes with several other Asian nations about sovereignty over areas of the South 
China Sea, which is thought to contain large reserves of oil and natural gas. China and several other Asian 
nations claim sovereignty over the uninhabited Spratly Islands and their possible oil and gas deposits. Half 
the world’s merchant shipping tonnage passes through the South China Sea. Perhaps hoping to check Chinese 
power in East Asia, U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton stated that the resolution of territorial disputes in 
the South China Sea was in America’s national interest.69 China’s commitment to modernize and expand the 
Cambodian port at Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand should enhance China’s capacity to project naval 
power into disputed regions and to assert this power in the event of a conflict that threatened vital shipping 
lanes including the extremely important Strait of Malacca.70 Given its commercial and geo-political interests, 
there was no political imperative for the Chinese government to exhibit anything other than indifference to 
the ongoing battles over the scope of the ECCC trials. It is difficult to think of a country that has ever sacrificed 
what it perceived as vital national interests to promote something as insignificant to it as the ECCC trials 
were to China. (China’s long history of support for the Khmer Rouge probably also helped make it a less than 
enthusiastic advocate of a comprehensive judicial airing of the crimes of Democratic Kampuchea.)
Picken describes Japan, a major donor to the ECCC, as generally supportive of Hun Sen and the CPP.71 
As a nation competing with China for influence in the region, there is no real political or economic incentive 
for the Japanese government to pressure or antagonize the government of Cambodia by engaging in disputes 
about the number of trials that should be held for former Khmer Rouge officials.
With Cold War tensions long gone and Vietnam far more concerned about its much larger regional rival, 
China, the relationship between Cambodia and Vietnam has grown stronger as commercial ties deepened. 
In 2009, Vietnam reached an agreement with Cambodia, which would permit the Vietnamese to grow about 
a quarter million acres of rubber in Cambodia.72 By 2010, trade between Cambodia and Vietnam totaled 
$1.2 billion.73 Given the prospect of further commercial agreements between the two nations, there was little 
reason for the Vietnamese to pressure Hun Sen into proceeding with a trial in any direction that he did not 
wish to permit as he maneuvered through and around the long enduring ECCC negotiations and trials.
Vietnam’s main geo-political interest was defending its claims to portions of the South China Sea. There was 
little political or economic incentive for the Vietnamese government to disrupt its relationship with Cambodia by 
concerning itself with the trial of the elderly leaders and other functionaries of a regime it had driven from power 
more than three decades ago, especially when the Hun Sen government was seen as a close partner of Vietnam.
Beyond Guilt and Innocence:  The ECCC and Regime Change 
To some human rights organizations the trial of fact and law with regard to Khmer Rouge defendants was 
a secondary purpose of the Cambodia Tribunal. Duncan McCargo argues that retributive justice is one of only 
several goals that some external NGOs have for the ECCC.74 (Retributive justice in the Cambodian context is 
simply punishment for those guilty of atrocities and genocide during the reign of the Khmer Rouge). McCargo 
suggests that international organizations and advocacy groups had a number of objectives including the far 
reaching objective of incremental regime change.
One of these goals was to provide an example of a well-run trial in a nation where according to a study 
by the Nordic Institute for Asian Studies, many criminal trials lasted less than 20 minutes. It was hoped that 
the ECCC would have a contagion effect that would improve the Cambodian criminal justice system. Closely 
related to the goal of transforming the judicial processes of Cambodia was the aim of altering the culture of 
impunity that allowed powerful people to plunder, steal and literally get away with murder in Cambodia. 
Some analysts and advocates argued that the source of this lawlessness by the rich and powerful was rooted 
in the fact that the Khmer Rouge leaders had never been punished for their crimes. The hope was that the 
imposition of legal processes and punishment against key Khmer Rouge cadre would undermine the culture 
of impunity in Cambodia.75
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The ultimate objective of some human rights advocates was indeed gradual regime change. The obstacles 
to achieving this very ambitious objective were at once enormous and should have been obvious from the 
outset of the process of establishing a tribunal. The Hun Sen CPP government was, as evidenced by its conduct 
over more than a decade, interested in a far less expansive outcome. (In any nation the incumbent regime is 
not likely to be interested in regime change). The conditions that the Cambodian government was able to 
place on the various aspects of the ECCC meant that from the outset of the proceedings broad transformative 
goals were unlikely to be achieved. The lack of a sustained commitment to goals as far reaching as judicial 
process contagion or transforming the entire Cambodian political system by any nations possessing global or 
regional power, made achieving such ambitious aims a virtual impossibility from the outset. (Regime change 
is, of course, by no means guaranteed even when there is much greater international commitment than was 
evident in Cambodia.)
Politics, Justice, and Genocide Tribunals
The question of legal, political, and moral responsibility for genocide is always enmeshed in various 
political and strategic calculations. The case of Turkish government denial of the Armenian genocide is 
quite well known and a good example of the politics of genocide recognition. While there is, of course, no 
possibility of holding a trial, in the traditional sense, for perpetrators of a genocide that occurred in 1915, 
the government of Turkey has not been willing to admit that there was a genocide of the Armenians residing 
in Anatolia76. Some foreign governments have geopolitical motives that inhibit criticism of official Turkish 
unwillingness to acknowledge what is now a well-documented genocide.  For example, the United States has 
been allied with Turkey; a member of NATO since 1952, for several decades and the U.S. government has been 
unwilling to officially use the word genocide when referring to the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. The State 
of Israel has long refused to use the term genocide in reference to the fate of the Ottoman Armenians. Israel 
has, until quite recently, had quite close relations with Turkey.77 This relationship was especially important to 
Israel because Turkey has a 98 percent Muslim population. Neither Israel nor the United States was prepared 
to place strategic interests at risk for the goal of recognizing an historical truth.
 Genocide in the past or present may also be neglected out of indifference rather than strategic calculation. 
At most times, small countries like Cambodia do not figure all that prominently in the concerns of politicians 
and foreign policy elites in many countries. In the summer of 1991, the administration of President George 
H.W. Bush was little concerned about events in the Balkans as the region descended into communal violence. 
Secretary of State James Baker’s view of the United States’ role in attempting to resolve the deadly conflicts that 
erupted after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 was captured by his remark that, “we do not have a dog 
in this fight.”78 As for the president, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft reported that, “The President 
would say to me once a week: ‘Tell me again what this is all about.’”79 Even a president with a long resume in 
foreign policy and a noted preference for acting in the international rather than the domestic policy arena, was 
not easily engaged by the outbreak of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia.
In an opinion piece in The New York Times in 2010, Professor Ear gave his bitter assessment of the trial to 
that date. “Plagued by corruption, the tribunal was essentially hijacked to advance domestic and international 
political agendas. For domestic politicians...to reduce its scope by limiting the number of individuals it could 
indict (five) while currying international favor addressing, superficially at least, crimes against humanity…
Cambodians have learned their lesson: Don’t believe in international promises; they are not kept.”80 While 
it would be difficult to argue against Ear’s moving conclusion, his findings are not so surprising. Politicians 
on the national and international stage acted largely in their own self and national interests with regard to 
the ECCC. It would have been quite shocking if much political capital had been expended on overcoming 
Cambodian government resistance to a series of trials of leaders of a genocidal government that had been 
deposed three decades ago. The Cambodian genocide trials are hardly the first time that the imperatives of 
realpolitik triumphed over concerns for truth and justice in matters of genocide and other mass killings.81 The 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal is also unlikely to be the last time such hard political calculations trump the desires of 
victims for more comprehensive justice.
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